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Abstract. We present a method for the security an-
alysis of realistic models over oﬀ-the-shelf systems and
their conﬁguration by formal, machine-checked proofs.
The presentation follows a large case study based on a for-
mal security analysis of a CVS-Server architecture.
The analysis is based on an abstract architecture (en-
forcing a role-based access control), which is reﬁned to an
implementation architecture (based on the usual discre-
tionary access control provided by the POSIX environ-
ment). Both architectures serve as a skeleton to formulate
access control and conﬁdentiality properties.
Both the abstract and the implementation architec-
ture are speciﬁed in the language Z. Based on a logical
embedding of Z into Isabelle/HOL, we provide formal,
machine-checked proofs for consistency properties of the
speciﬁcation, for the correctness of the reﬁnement, and
for security properties.
Keywords: Veriﬁcation – Security – Reﬁnement –
POSIX – Z
1 Introduction
These days, the Concurrent Versions System (CVS) is
a widely used tool for version management in many in-
dustrial software development projects and plays a key
role in open source projects usually carried out by highly
distributed teams [3, 4]. (See http://www.cvshome.org.)
CVS provides a central database (the repository) and
means to synchronize local modiﬁcations of partial copies
(the working copies) with the repository. The repository
can be accessed via a network; this requires a security
architecture establishing authentication, access control,
and nonrepudiation. A further complication of the CVS
security architecture stems from the fact that the admin-
istration of authentication and access control is done via
CVS itself, i.e., the authentication table is accessed and
modiﬁed via standard CVS operations.
This work emerged from our own experiences with
setting up a CVS-Server for more than 80 users world-
wide. Besides overcoming a number of security problems
(see, e.g., http://www.cvshome.org/dev/security9706.
html), we had to develop an improved CVS-Server con-
ﬁguration described in [1] meeting two system design
requirements: ﬁrst, we had to provide a conﬁguration
of a CVS-Server that enforces a role-based access con-
trol [13]; second, we had to develop an “open CVS-Server
architecture,” where the repository is part of the shared
ﬁlesystem of a local network and the server is a regu-
lar process on a machine in this network. While such
an architecture has a number of advantages, the cor-
rectness and trustworthiness of the security mechanisms
become a major concern. Thus, we decided to apply
formal modeling and analysis techniques to meet the
challenge.
In this paper, we present the method we developed for
analyzing the security problems of complex systems such
as the CVS-Server and its conﬁguration. As a result, we
provide the following contributions:
1. A modeling technique that we call architectural mod-
eling, which has an abstraction level in between the
usual behavioral modeling used in protocol analysis
and code veriﬁcation;
2. A technique to use system architecture models for
deﬁning security requirements;
3. The presentation of the mapping from security re-
quirements to concrete security technologies as a data-
reﬁnement problem;
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4. Mechanized proof techniques for reﬁnements and se-
curity properties over system transitions; and
5. Reusable models for widely used security technologies.
In particular, we provide means to model a certain type
of security policies and show how security analysis can be
performed not only on the abstract but also on the con-
crete level.
The paper is organized as follows. After introducing
some background material, e.g., CVS, our chosen speciﬁ-
cation formalism Z, and the architectural modeling style,
we present the model of the abstract system architecture.
We proceed with the model of the POSIX ﬁlesystem as
an infrastructure for the implementation architecture and
present the implementation architecture itself. Then we
describe the reﬁnement relation between the system ar-
chitecture and the implementation architecture, and the
analysis of security properties at the diﬀerent layers based
on formal proofs in an interactive theorem prover.
2 Background
2.1 The CVS operations
For the purpose of this paper, it is suﬃcient to mention
only the most common CVS commands (initiated by the
client). These are: login for client authenticating, add for
registering ﬁles or directories for version control, commit
for transferring local changes to the repository, and up-
date for incorporating changes from the repository (e.g.,
fetching the latest version from the repository) into the
working copy. Additionally, CVS provides functionality
for accessing the history, for branching, for logging infor-
mation (which is beyond the scope of this paper), and it
provides a mechanism for conﬂict resolution (e.g., merg-
ing the diﬀerent versions), which is only modeled as an
abstract operation. Further, in order to facilitate both
the reﬁnement and the security analysis, we will include
in our CVS model a operation that is, strictly speaking,
not part of CVS but part of the operating system: the
operation modify. This operation models changes of the
working copy, e.g., by editing a ﬁle.
2.2 Z and Isabelle/HOL-Z
As our speciﬁcation formalism, we chose Z [16] for the fol-
lowing reasons: ﬁrst, Z ﬁts our modeling problem since
the complex states of our components suggest using a for-
malism with rich theories for data structures. Second,
the syntax and semantics of Z are speciﬁed in an ISO
standard;1 for future standardization eﬀorts of operating
system libraries (e.g., similar to the POSIX [17] model
in Sect. 3.3.2), Z is therefore a likely candidate. Third, Z
comes with a data-reﬁnement notion [16, p. 136], which
1 Z formal speciﬁcation notation – syntax, type system and se-
mantics, 2002. ISO/IEC 13568:2002
provides a correctness notion of the underlying “security
technology mapping” between the two architectures and
a means to compute the proof obligations. We assume
a rough familiarity with Z (the interested reader is re-
ferred to excellent textbooks on Z such as [16, 18]).
As our modeling and theorem-proving environment
we chose Isabelle/HOL-Z [2], an integrated documenta-
tion, type-checking, and theorem-proving environment
for Z speciﬁcations built on top of Isabelle/HOL. Is-
abelle [9] is a generic theorem prover, i.e., new object
logics can be introduced by specifying their syntax and
inference rules. Isabelle/HOL is an instance of Isabelle
with Church’s higher-order logic (HOL) [7], a classical
logic with equality. Isabelle/HOL-Z is a conservative em-
bedding of Z into HOL (which is semantically isomor-
phic to Z). As a result, Isabelle/HOL-Z combines up-
to-date theorem-proving technology with a widespread,
standardized speciﬁcation formalism and powerful docu-
mentation facilities.
2.3 Architectural modeling
As a means to identify conceptual entities of the prob-
lem domain and to structure the overall speciﬁcation, we
found it useful to describe the architecture of the sys-
tem on several abstraction layers. Following Garlan and
Shaw’s approach [6, 15], architectures are composed of
components (such as clients, servers, or stores like the
ﬁlesystem) and connectors (like channels, shared vari-
ables, etc). In this terminology it is straightforward to
make the mentioned architectures more precise (as im-
plementation architecture, we present the intended “open
server architecture;” see Fig. 1). We assume for each op-
eration (such as add) a shared variable as connector that
keeps all necessary information that goes to and from
the components. This paves the way to formalize this
architecture by describing the transition relation of the
combined system by the parallel composition of the local
transition relations of the components synchronized over
the corresponding shared variable. Since such transition
relations can be represented in Z by operation schemas,
we can thus deﬁne, for example:
CVS_add=Client_add
∧Server_add\addshared variable
where ∧ is the schema-conjunction and \ the hiding op-
erator (i.e., an existential quantiﬁer). Throughout this
paper we will only present combined operation schemas
and model properties over the transitive closure of their
transition relations.
2.4 Architecture reﬁnement
When analyzing security architectures one can sepa-
rate an abstract security architecture (Sect. 3.2), which is
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Fig. 1. The diﬀerent CVS-server architectures
merely a framework for describing the security require-
ments, from an implementation architecture (Sect. 3.3),
where a mapping to security mechanisms is described
(Fig. 2). By connecting the abstract and the concrete
layer formally, it is possible to reason about safety and se-
curity properties on the abstract level. Such a connection
between abstract and more concrete views on a system
and their semantic underpinning is well known under the
term reﬁnement, and security technology mappings can
be understood as a special case of this. Various reﬁne-
ment notions have been proposed [11, 18]; in our setting,
we chose to use only a simple data-reﬁnement notion fol-
lowing Spivey [16].
2.5 Security models vs. security technologies
Many security models distinguish between objects (e.g.,
data) and subjects (e.g., users). Using role-based access
control (RBAC) [13] one assigns each subject at least one
role (e.g., “administrator” role), and access of objects is
granted or denied by the role a subject is acting in. Fur-
ther, roles can be hierarchically ordered, e.g., subjects
in the “administrator” role are allowed to do everything
other roles are allowed to. Our CVS-Server uses such a hi-
erarchic RBAC model.
In an RBACmodel, the decision as to which roles may
have access to which objects is made during system de-
sign and cannot be changed by regular users. In contrast,
in a discretionary access control (DAC) model, every ob-
Fig. 2. Reﬁning security architectures
ject belongs to a speciﬁc subject (its owner), and the
owner is allowed to change the access policies at any time,
hence “discretionary.” For example, a DAC implementa-
tion that also allows grouping users is the Unix /POSIX
ﬁlesystem layer [17] access control.
Based on a DAC that supports groups, one can “im-
plement” an RBAC model by a special setup [12]. We
use a similar technique to implement a hierarchic RBAC
model for our CVS-Server on top of the POSIX ﬁlesystem
layer, which is described in Sect. 3.3.3. However, we will
analyze the concrete form in which DAC is implemented
in POSIX and not a conceptual model thereof.
3 The CVS-Server case study
The Z speciﬁcation of the CVS-Server [1] consists of more
than 120 pages, and the associated proof scripts are about
13000 lines of code. The organization of the Z-sections
follows directly the overall scheme presented in Fig. 3.
The Z-sections AbsState and AbsOperations describe the
abstract system architecture of the client and the server
components. The Z-section SysConsistency contains the
consistency conditions (conservatism of axiomatic deﬁni-
tions, deﬁnedness of applications, nonblocking operation
schemas) of the system architecture. This is mirrored at
the implementation architecture level by the structures
FileSystem, CVS-Server , and ImplConsistency. The Z-
section Reﬁnement contains the usual abstraction pred-
icates relating the abstract and the concrete states, and
also the proof obligations for this reﬁnement. The security
properties, together with the corresponding proof obliga-
tions, are deﬁned in the Z-sections SysArchSec and Im-
plArchSec.
3.1 Entities of the security model
Following the standard RBAC model, we introduce ab-
stract types for CVS clients (users)Cvs_Uid, permissions
236 A.D. Brucker, B. Wolﬀ: A veriﬁcation approach to applied system security
Fig. 3. Organizing the speciﬁcation into Z-sections
Cvs_Perm (which are isomorphic to roles in our setting),
and CVS passwords Cvs_Passwd used to authenticate
a CVS client for a permission:
[Cvs_Uid,Cvs_Perm,Cvs_Passwd] .
Permissions are hierarchically organized by the reﬂex-
ive and transitive relation cvs_perm_order (over permis-
sions Cvs_Perm) with cvs_adm as greatest element:
We turn now to the security entities and mechanisms
of the CVS-Server and the clients: ﬁrst we have to model
the working copies and the repositories as maps assigning
abstract names Abs_Name to data Abs_Data (both types
are abstract in our model):
[Abs_Name,Abs_Data]
ABS_DATATAB≡Abs_Name→+ Abs_Data
A CVS-Server provides an authorization table, which
is used to control access within the repository. The server
stores for each ﬁle in the repository the required permis-
sion. These tables are modeled as follows:
AUTH_TAB ≡ Cvs_Uid×Cvs_Passwd
→+ Cvs_Perm
ABS_PERMTAB≡Abs_Name→+ Cvs_Perm
Clients possess in their working also a table that as-
signs to each abstract name a CVS client and another
map that associates each CVS client to the password pre-
viously used during the CVS login procedure. The inter-
play of these tables will be discussed later; here we just
deﬁne them:
ABS_UIDTAB ≡Abs_Name→+ Cvs_Uid ,
PASSWD_TAB≡ Cvs_Uxid→+ Cvs_Passwd .
3.2 System architecture
In this section, we give a brief overview of how we model
the system architecture, which is divided into: the state
of the server (including the repository), the state of the
client (including the working copy), and a set of CVS op-
erations working over both of them.
It is a distinguishing feature of a CVS-Server that it
stores the authentication data inside the repository such
that they can be accessed and modiﬁed with CVS oper-
ations. This implies certain formal prerequisites: we re-
quire an abstract name abs_cvsauth to be associated with
data that can be converted into an authentication table
via a postulated function authtab.
Modeling the server’s state as a Z schema is straight-
forward. The state contains the repository rep and the
map rep_permtab containing the required permissions for
each ﬁle. Accessing the authentication table inside rep
will require having the role cvs_adm. RepositoryState is
modeled as follows:
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The state of the client component contains the work-
ing copy wc, the wc_uidtab assigning a CVS client to
each ﬁle and a password table abs_passwd with creden-
tials (passwords) used in previous CVS login operations
(abs_passwd models the ﬁle .cvspass). Thus, for any data
in the working copy and whenever an access to it may be
processed, an individual role may be generated and vali-
dated by the server with respect to its current repository
state. Further, there is a set of abstract nameswfiles that
is used as ﬁlter in update and commit operations. This ﬁl-
ter corresponds to the concept of the working directory
in the implementation, i.e., the eﬀects of these operations
are restricted to ﬁles stored within the working directory:
In what follows, we deﬁne the abstract CVS opera-
tions that model combined state transitions of the client
and the repository. Due to space constraints, we only
present login and commit.
The login operation simply stores the authentication
data on the client side. This is used to authenticate a CVS
user for client permissions. The ∆ and Ξ notations are
used in Z to import the schemas in two variants: one
variant as a copy, the other by replacing all variables
by corresponding stroked variables (e.g., wc′) describing
the successor state. Ξ also introduces equalities enforcing
that the components of the previous state are equal to the
poststate components.
The commit (ci) operation usually takes a set of ﬁles
as arguments (here denoted by files?). The case that no
arguments may be passed is modeled by the possibility of
setting files? to the set of all ﬁles ABS_NAME .
Now we address the core of our hierarchic RBAC
model of the system architecture, the has_access predi-
cate. As a prerequisite, we deﬁne the shortcut is_valid_in
for checking that a CVS client, together with a credential
(password), represents a valid role with respect to the cur-
rent repository:
Further, the has_access predicate ensures is_valid_in
and that the permissions resulting from these credentials
are suﬃcient to access the requested ﬁle according to the
role hierarchy:
The commit operation consists of the construction of
a new repository rep′ and a new table with required per-
missions rep_permtab′ thatwere constructed via the over-
ride operator ⊕ from previous states of these tables. For
rep′, three cases can be distinguished: (i) either a ﬁle in
the repository does not occur in the working copy, inwhich
case it is unchanged; (ii) it occurs in the working copy but
not in the repository, in which case it is copied provided
a valid permission is available in the wc_uid_tab of the
working copy; or (iii) the ﬁle exists both in working copy
and repository, in which case the working copy ﬁle over-
rides the repository ﬁle whenever the client has access:
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The table rep_permtab′ is extended by permissions
for ﬁles that are new in the repository (based on the per-
missions used for committing these ﬁles). Further, the
table wc_uid_tab is updated by the add operation, which
we omit here.
In addition to these abstract models of the CVS op-
erations, we provide a modify operation that explicitly
models interactions of users with their ﬁles by modifying
the ﬁles of the working copy of the client state.
3.3 The implementation architecture
The implementation architecture of CVS-Server is in-
tended to model realistically the security mechanisms
used to achieve the security goals formalized in the pre-
vious system architecture. Therefore, it captures the rele-
vant operating system environment methods, i.e., POSIX
methods in our case, for accessing ﬁles and changing their
access attributes. We derived our POSIX model by for-
malizing the speciﬁcation documents [17] and detailed
system descriptions [5] and by validating it by carefully
chosen tests and by inspections of critical parts of the
system sources. In this POSIX model, the CVS Filesys-
tem will be embedded, i.e., a repository is described as
some area in the ﬁlesystem where ﬁle attributes are set in
a suitable way.
3.3.1 Modeling basic data structures
We declare basic abstract sorts for POSIX user IDs, group
IDs, data (ﬁle contents left abstract in this model), ele-
mentary ﬁlenames, and ﬁle paths.
[Uid,Gid,Data,Name]
Path≡ seqName
We assume a static table groups that assigns to each
user a set of groups he belongs to. We also describe a spe-
cial user ID root, modeling the system administrator. As
we will show later, all security goals can only be achieved
for all users except root, because root is allowed to do (al-
most) everything.
groups: Uid → P Gid
root: Uid
3.3.2 Modeling the POSIX ﬁlesystem access control
Within POSIX, every ﬁle belongs to a unique pair of
owner (user) and group, and ﬁle access is divided into
access by the user (owner), the group, or other (world).
The POSIX discretionary access control (DAC) distin-
guishes access for reading (r), writing (w), and executing
(x). We also model the “set group id” (sg) on directo-
ries, which aﬀects the default group of newly created ﬁles
within that directory (see [5] for more technical details
about the Unix /POSIX DAC):
Perm ::= ru|wu|xu|rg|wg|xg|ro|wo|xo|sg .
The ﬁlesystem consists of a map from a ﬁle path to ﬁle
content (which is either Data for regular ﬁles or Unit for
directories2) and of ﬁle attributes (assigning to each ﬁle
or directory the permissions,3 the user ID of the owner,
and the group it belongs to). Our concept of ﬁle attributes
may easily be extended by adding new components to its
records.
Unit ::=Nil
FILESYS_TAB ≡ Path→+ (Data+Unit)
FILEATTR ≡ [perm : PPerm;uid : Uid; gid :Gid]
FILEATTR_TAB ≡ Path→+ FILEATTR
We use type sums for modeling the FILESYS_TAB ,
which are not part of the Z standard. Type sums can sim-
ulate enumerations in Z-free type deﬁnitions on the ﬂy.
The two functions Inl :X→ (X+Y ) and Inr : Y → (X+
Y ) are provided for building type sums.
For testing if a directory contains a speciﬁc entry (ei-
ther a ﬁle or a directory), we provide the function is_in.
Further, we provide functions that test for regular ﬁles
(is_ﬁle_in) and for directories (is_dir_in); their deﬁnitions
are straightforward:
At this point we are ready to model the ﬁlesystem
state, which mainly describes the mapping of (name)
paths to their attributes. As mentioned earlier, we require
that all deﬁned paths be “preﬁx-closed,” i.e., all preﬁx
paths must be deﬁned in the ﬁlesystem (thus constituting
a tree) and point to directories.
In addition to the ﬁlesystem state, we introduce
a state schema ProcessState for client-related informa-
2 We do not consider special ﬁles, like devices, named pipes or
process ﬁles.
3 The terms attributes and permissions are used interchangeably.
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tion, namely, the current user and group ID, the client’s
umask (which is used to set the initial ﬁle attributes on
new ﬁles), and current working directory (wdir). The
working directory is often used as an implicit parameter
to ﬁlesystem and CVS operations:
As a prerequisite for describing functions that do
modiﬁcations on the ﬁle system, we need to model the
POSIX DAC in detail. Therefore, we ﬁrst introduce
a function has_attrib, which decides whether the at-
tributes (read, write, and execute) of a ﬁle are set with
respect to a speciﬁc user (and the groups he is a mem-
ber of). Within this function, a crucial detail of the
POSIX access model is formalized, namely, that ﬁle ac-
cess is checked by sequentially testing the following con-
ditions (leading to an overall failure if the ﬁrst condition
fails):
1. If the user owns the ﬁle, he can only access the ﬁle if
the access attributes for users grant access.
2. If the user is a member of the group owning the ﬁle, he
can only access the ﬁle if the access attributes for the
group grant access.
3. Lastly, the access attributes for others are checked.
These requirements may lead to some unexpected conse-
quences, e.g., assume a user u is a member of the group
g and owner of a ﬁle with the permissions 〈|perm ==
{rg, ro}, uid == u, gid== g|〉. Curiously, ﬁle access will
be denied to him, while granted for all others in his group,
because the rights speciﬁed for the user precede the rights
given for the group.
Based on has_attrib we introduce shortcuts for check-
ing read, write, and execute attributes (e.g., has_w_
attrib) of ﬁles and directories as well as deﬁnitions
for checking the read, write, and execute access (e.g.,
has_w_access).
As an example of our approach to specifying POSIX
operations, we present the (shortened) ﬁle remove speci-
ﬁcation [17], which corresponds to unlink():
The unlink() function shall fail and shall not unlink the
ﬁle if:
– A component of path does not name an existing ﬁle
or path is an empty string.
– Search permission is denied for a component of the
path preﬁx, or write permission is denied on the
directory containing the directory entry to be re-
moved.
This text is formalized by a Z operation schema rm as fol-
lows: The ﬁrst condition in the body is common for most
ﬁlesystem operations and requires that the path of the ﬁle
be a valid one in the ﬁlesystem table. The second condi-
tion requires that the client have write permissions on the
ﬁle and the working directory (“the directory containing
the directory entry to be removed”), which is checked via
the has_w_access predicate:
The deﬁnitions for the remaining ﬁlesystem opera-
tions are similar; see [1] for details.
3.3.3 Mapping CVS access control onto POSIX DAC
We turn now to a crucial aspect of the implementation of
the security goals by security mechanisms provided from
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standard POSIX DAC: any CVS role will be mapped to
a particular pair of a system owner and a set of system
groups. This mapping has the consequence of an inheri-
tance mechanism for generating default roles when creat-
ing new objects in the repository. Additionally, there is
a mechanism to “downscale” and “upscale” the permis-
sions in the repository for the CVS administrator (not
described here).
For every CVS operation, the server determines the
CVS role according to the client’s CVS ID and password.
These roles are then mapped to POSIX user and group
IDs, and these are compared to the ﬁle attributes of the
ﬁles and directories the operations operate on. This trans-
lation is done by the two functions cvsperm2uid and
cvsperm2gid.
It is important to note that CVS IDs (Cvs_Uid) are
independent of POSIX IDs (Uid) and that the POSIX
IDs that are used by CVS are disjoint from “normal”
POSIX user IDs, i.e., it is impossible to login with such
a special POSIX ID.
From these distinctness constraints it follows that the
POSIX system administrator and the CVS administra-
tor may be diﬀerent. Moreover, we require that the group
table (administrated by the system administrator and no-
body else) be compatible with cvs_perm_order. These
requirements have to be assured during installation of
a CVS server.
The CVS repository is a subtree of the normal ﬁlesys-
tem; its root is denoted by the absolute path cvs_rep,
and all paths inside the repository are relative to the
root cvs_rep. Further, the administrative ﬁles of CVS are
stored in the CVSROOT directory, which is a subdirec-
tory of cvs_rep, and the ﬁle that contains all authenti-
cation information is called cvsauth and is located inside
CVSROOT .
3.3.4 Modeling the CVS ﬁlesystem
A major design decision for our speciﬁcation is to enrich
the FileSystem state by new state components relevant
to CVS or, more precisely, the combined client/server
component of CVS. In CVS, working copies contain spe-
ciﬁc attributes assigned to the ﬁles; we restrict ourselves
to security-relevant attributes, i.e., the CVS client ID and
password, and the path rep where the ﬁle is located in the
repository. This information is kept in a separate table
implicitly associated to the working copies.
CVS_ATTR ≡ [rep : Path; f_uid : Cvs_Uid]
CVS_ATTR_TAB ≡ Path→+ CVS_ATTR
Due to space constraints, we only show some require-
ments of the combined POSIX and CVS ﬁlesystem:
– Working copies and the repository are distinct areas of
the ﬁlesystem.
– The repository contains a special directory that holds
the administrative data of CVS. Certain restrictive ac-
cess permissions must be ensured to this directory and
its contents to preserve the system integrity.
– Requirements on ﬁle attributes within the repository:
– Since the owners of ﬁles must be POSIX user IDs
that are disjoint from “regular” POSIX user IDs,
the group IDs must be legal with respect to the
CVS role hierarchy. This guarantees that regular
users only have the rights described by the ﬁle at-
tributes for others. Thus, our initial invariant for
the base directory of the repository implies that
such a user cannot do anything, using only POSIX
operations, within the repository.
– Read, write, and execute permissions are the same
for user and group. Together with our group setup
this ensures that the initial CVS role and all roles
with higher precedence will have the same rights to
access that ﬁle.
These invariants are formally described in the axiomatic
deﬁnition:
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We turn now to a formal description of the repository
within the ﬁlesystem. This invariant of the system is cap-
tured in the state schema Cvs_FileSystem:
In addition to rep_attributes, we impose similar re-
quirements for the administrative area of the repository
by the predicate attr_in_root. Further, we describe in
the predicate attr_outside_root the requirements for the
data in the repository, i.e., ﬁles that are subject to version
control. Both axiomatic deﬁnitions are omitted here.
We have now established a basis for the operations
on the combined POSIX and CVS environment. As
in Sect. 3.2, we present the login and commit operations in
order to compare the two diﬀerent architecture levels.
Before we describe the operations of the CVS-
Server we need to model the access to the CVS
authentication table (get_auth_tab) that is part of the
cvs_repCVSROOT directory and underlies the stan-
Fig. 4. The speciﬁcation of the commit command (implementation architecture)
dard access discipline of CVS-Server. In particular, the
authentication table is only modiﬁable by the CVS ad-
ministrator, but not by any other client of the system.
The login operation updates the variable cvs_passwd,
provided that for the combination of user ID and pass-
word the authentication will succeed.
In the commit operation, the current working direc-
tory wdir can be restricted by the parameter p? to just
one ﬁle or directory. All ﬁles below p? for which the
client has access will be committed. We use the function
cutPath to remove a given preﬁx from a path.
In contrast to the system architecture speciﬁcation we
also must determine the POSIX ﬁle attributes of the ﬁles.
The particularity of the update and the commit operation
is the use of rep_access, which computes the paths into
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the repository to which the client has read access accord-
ing to his CVS role.
The schema cvs_ci (see Fig. 4) models the commit
command. We require that the client have read access for
the ﬁle or directory in the current working directory and
suﬃciently high-ranking role to modify the repository.
4 Formal analysis
A formal model, even if successfully type-checked, is in it-
self not a value of its own: it must be validated, e.g., by
testing techniques or by formal proof activities as in our
approach. In this section, we present a formal consistency
check of the speciﬁcations, and we show that the imple-
mentation architecture is, in a formal sense, a reﬁnement
of the abstract system architecture. We specify and prove
security properties of the type “no combination of user-
commands will enable a user to write into the repository,
except if he has the required access rights.”
4.1 Checking the consistency
Two types of “sanity checks” are useful and have been
carried out with HOL-Z [2] routinely:
– Checking deﬁnedness for all applications of partial
functions in their context; undeﬁned applications usu-
ally indicate that some part of the precondition of
a schema context is missing; and
– Checking the state invariant of all operation schemas;
in particular, we require that in a schema, all syntactic
preconditions (i.e., the conjuncts in the predicate part
that contain occurrences of variables without stroke
“ ′ ” and “ ! ” suﬃx) suﬃce to show that a successor
state exists.
Violating these conditions results, not in logical inconsis-
tencies, but in unprovable statements or operation deﬁni-
tions with undesired semantical eﬀects.
4.2 Establishing the reﬁnement
To prove that the concrete implementation architecture
correctly implements the abstract system architecture,
we have to deﬁne an abstraction schema R that relates
the components of the abstract state to the components
of the concrete state. In particular, we must map abstract
names and data to paths and ﬁles in the sense of the
POSIX ﬁlesystem, and the working copies and reposito-
ries of the abstract model must be related to certain areas
of the ﬁlesystem; the authentication tables must be re-
lated, the user must not be root (the reﬁnement simply
does not work otherwise), and the ﬁle attributes in the
concrete ﬁlesystem must be convertible along the map-
ping discussed in Sect. 3.3.3.
Due to limited space, we will only show two con-
straints of R formally. As a prerequisite, let us deﬁne
a function Rname2path, which maps abstract names,
to ﬁle paths in the implementation model. One con-
straint is that abs_cvsauth is mapped to the right
path and the authentication tables in both models are
equal:
Rname2path(abs_cvsauth) = cvs_rep
〈CVSROOT , cvsauth〉
authtab(rep) = get_auth_tab(files)
The last constraint we present here forces the abstract
working copy to have a counterpart in the implementa-
tion working copy:
Rname2path(|domwc|) = domwcs_attributes
To verify the reﬁnement relation R, following Spivey
in [16], we must prove two reﬁnement conditions for each
operation on the abstract state and its corresponding op-
eration on the concrete state: Condition (a) ensures that
a concrete operation terminates whenever their corres-
ponding abstract operation is guaranteed to terminate,
and condition (b) ensures that the state after the concrete
operation represents one of those abstract states in which
the abstract operation could terminate.
As an example of the reﬁnement, we show the in-
stantiation of conditions (a) and (b) for the CVS login
operation. The reﬁnement conditions, though, as deﬁned
in [16], assume that both operations have the same in-
put parameters, but since we deﬁne them diﬀerently in
our two models, we introduce an additional schema Asm,
which is used to insert further assumptions into the re-
ﬁnement proofs (the eﬀect could also have been achieved
by a suitable renaming):
In the case of the login operation, these assumptions
are simple since the parameters are of the same type but
diﬀer in name. Instantiating conditions (a) and (b) for the
login operation and adding the assumption schema Asm
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leads to the following two proof obligations:
logina ≡ ∀ClientState;RepositoryState;
ProcessState;Cvs_FileSystem;
passwd?, cvs_pwd? :Cvs_Passwd;uid?,
cvs_uid? : Cvs_Uid.
Asm∧pre abs_login∧R =⇒ pre cvs_login
loginb ≡ ∀ClientState;RepositoryState;
ProcessState;Cvs_FileSystem;
ProcessState′;Cvs_FileSystem′; passwd?,
cvs_pwd? :Cvs_Passwd;uid?
cvs_uid? : Cvs_Uid.
Asm∧pre abs_login∧R∧ cvs_login
=⇒ (∃ClientState′;RepositoryState′.
R′∧abs_login)
The obligations for the other operations are deﬁned anal-
ogously. So far, we have proved these obligations formally
for the reﬁnement of login, add, and update. These proofs
have helped us considerably in identifying subtle side con-
ditions in our model and thus to get our real CVS conﬁg-
uration “right”.
4.3 Security properties in architecture layers
Specifying the security properties motivates a Z-section
for the system architecture and one for the implementa-
tion architecture, both containing a classical behavioral
speciﬁcation. In SysArchSec we investigate security prop-
erties of the system architecture. In ImplArchSec we in-
vestigate the same properties and additional ones that are
speciﬁc to the implementation architecture.
4.3.1 General scheme of security properties
As an interface between the operation schemas of the two
architecture layers and the behavioral part allowing us to
specify safety properties, we convert suitably restricted
operation schemas of both system layers into explicit re-
lations over the underlying state. The purpose of these
restrictions is to provide a slot for side conditions that
are related to the security model and not the functional
model described in the previous sections:
rop1 = op1∧R1
· · ·
ropn = opn∧Rn
where each ropi represents the operation schema opi con-
strained by the restriction schemaRi. Further the schema
disjunction step represents the overall step relation of the
system, which is converted into a transitively closed rela-
tion trans:
step = rop1∨ . . .∨ ropn ,
trans = {step|(θstate, θstate′)}∗
In the literature, three types of properties can be dis-
tinguished: One may formalize properties over the set of
reachable states, the set of possible transitions, or the set
of possible sequences of states (traces) of a system. While
the ﬁrst two types are only suﬃcient for classical safety
invariants (“something bad will never happen”), the lat-
ter two allow for the speciﬁcation of liveness properties
(“eventually something good will happen”). The general
scheme for properties over reachable states and possible
transitions for safety properties and the schema for live-
ness properties looks as follows:
SPRS = ∀σ : trans(|init|)•Pσ
SPRT = ∀(σ, σ
′) : init trans•P (σ, σ′)
LPRT = ∀(σ, σ
′) : init trans•
∃(σ′′, σ′′′) : trans•P (σ, σ′, σ′′, σ′′′)
Note that the reachable states are restricted via the ex-
istential image operator or the domain restriction to the
states (respectively transitions) reachable from the set of
initial states init.
4.3.2 An instance of the general scheme: RBAC_write
We will exemplify the scheme SPRT for a crucial secu-
rity property, namely, “the user may write in the reposi-
tory only if he has RBAC-permissions,” which we will call
RBAC_write in what follows. Moreover, we will outline
the inductive proof.
As a prerequisite, we postulate two arbitrary sets
knows and invents ; a client “knows” a set of pairs of
roles and passwords and “invents” only ﬁles from a given
set of pairs from names to data. We assume invents
to be closed under the merge operation left abstract
in our model.4 On this basis, we deﬁne a security pol-
icy by providing suitable restrictions ropi for the system
operations.5 For example, we restrict the add operation
to elements in the domain of the invents-set, we assume
login is restricted to roles, and passwords to the client
knows set, themodify and add operations being restricted
to data the client “invents.” While these restrictions have
a more technical nature, a more conceptual restriction
of abs_ci is as follows: in the role cvs_adm, the authen-
tication table may only be altered such that rights are
withdrawn, not granted. A typical restriction looks as
follows:
abs_loginR≡abs_login
∧ [cvs_uid? :Cvs_Uid; passwd? :
Cvs_Passwd|
(cvs_uid?, passwd?) ∈Aknows]
4 This is very similar to the concept of abstract crypt functions
and the closures analz, synth, and parts in [10]; see discussion.
5 In practice, such security policies may be based on voluntary
self-restrictions of users or enforced by administrative means.
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Now we deﬁne the step-relation and its transitive closure
of the system architecture layer:
step ≡ abs_loginR∨abs_addR∨abs_ciR
∨abs_modifyR∨abs_up∨abs_cd
AbsState≡ ClientState∧RepositoryState
trans ≡ {step@(θAbsState, θAbsState′)}∗
Finally, for constructing the proof goal RBAC_write, we
instantiate the P in our schema SPRT by:
This property reads as follows: whenever there is
a change in the repository, and the changed ﬁle stems
from the users invents-set, the user must have valid
permissions according to the RBAC -model. We observe
that rbac_write is true whenever the repository does not
change, i.e., rbac_write(r, r, rt) holds.
4.3.3 A proof-outline
We will now present an exemplary proof (performed with
HOL-Z) for RBAC_write. The initial proof goal stating
that RBAC_write holds is reﬁned by unfolding elemen-
tary deﬁnitions and simpliﬁcation of Z notation to the
following proof state:
[[σ0 = (abs_passwd, rep, rep_permtab, wc,
wc_uidtab, wfiles);
σ1 = (abs_passwd
′, rep′, rep_permtab′, wc′,
wc_uidtab′, wfiles′);
AbsStateσ0;
AbsStateσ1;
(σ0, σ1) : {step@(σ0, σ1)}
∗
]] =⇒
σ0 : init
=⇒ rbac_write(rep, rep′, rep_permtab′)
Over this implication, we can now apply an induction rule
over the transitive closure:
This leads to two base cases and the induction step;
both base cases are trivially true due to observation
rbac_write(r, r, rt). Now it remains to show the induction
steps, which after some massaging look as follows:
[[ . . .
σ00 = (abs_passwdx, repx, rep_permtabx,wcx,
wc_uidtabx,wfilesx);
σ01 = (abs_passwdy, repy, rep_permtaby, wcy,
wc_uidtaby, wfilesy);
σ10 = (abs_passwdz, repz, rep_permtabz, wcz,
wc_uidtabz, wfilesz);
σ00 : init =⇒ rbac_write(repx, repy, rep_permtaby);
(σ00, σ01) : {step@(σ0, σ1)}
∗;
(σ00, σ10) : {step@(σ0, σ1)}
]] =⇒ σ00 : init
=⇒ rbac_write(repx, repz, rep_permtabz)
Here, the point of proof reﬁnement is the assumption
(σ00, σ01) : {step.(σ0, σ1)}∗, which can be decomposed via
the deﬁnition of step into a disjunction of schemas, where
the input variables are existentially quantiﬁed. A generic
tactic strips away the disjunctions and the existential
quantiﬁers in the assumption. The result is a case split
over all operations of the system architecture and univer-
sally quantiﬁed input parameters of all operations under
consideration. Now, the observation is crucial that all op-
erations except abs_ci do not change the repository and,
as a consequence of observation rbac_write(r, r, rt), im-
ply the truth of the step. We can therefore focus on the
case abs_ci:
[[ . . .
(σ00, σ01) : {step.(σ0, σ1)}
∗;
rbac_write(repx, repy, rep_permtaby);
abs_ci(abs_passwdy, abs_passwdz, filesq, repy, repz,
rep_permtaby, rep_permtabz, wcy, wcz,
wc_uidtaby, wc_uidtabz, wfilesy, wfilesz)
(σ00) : init;
]] =⇒ rbac_write(repx, repz, rep_permtabz)
This is the core part of an invariance proof: the
system made a transition from an initial system state
(with repx) to another (with repy), performing an arbi-
trary combination of operations, and the system behaved
well (i.e., rbac_write(repx, repy, rep_permtaby)). Now
a commit operation (abs_ci) occurs, and the question is
if the resulting state (with repz) will also fulﬁll our safety
property.
The core of this subproof is, of course, a case distinc-
tion following the deﬁnition of abs_ci shown in Sect. 3.2:
a ﬁle may be
1. In the repository and not in the working copy: then
abs_ci will change nothing;
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2. In the working copy and not in the repository: then
abs_ci will only change the latter if the current cre-
dentials are is_valid_in, which implies write_correct
as the rep_permtab was changed accordingly;
3. In both the working copy and the repository: then
abs_ci will only change the ﬁle in the repository if the
current credentials allow for has_access, which im-
plies write_correct.
The interested reader may note that the overall scheme
of the proof follows the structure of the general scheme
of the property descriptions, which allows for automated
tactic support that copes with Z-related technicalities,
the choice of the inductions, the decomposition of the
speciﬁcation, and the systematic derivation of state com-
ponents remaining invariant. Obviously, there is a high
potential for automation for this type of proofs, such that
the proof developer may be guided rather automatically
to the critical questions in the induction step.
4.3.4 Other examples
The veriﬁcation of the analogous propertyRBAC_read is
straightforward; ﬁles in the working copy of a client are ei-
ther invented by him (via the modify operation) or stem
from the repository, where the client knows a password to
obtain suﬃcient permissions.
An important, but quite obvious, liveness property
in the LPRT -scheme is RBAC_do_write: Provided the
client has access, it can change a ﬁle arbitrarily and
perform operations leaving the repository changed ac-
cordingly; the proof immediately boils down to abs_ci,
which is designed to fulﬁll this property. At ﬁrst sight,
RBAC_do_write looks very similar to RBAC_write;
however, note that both properties are independent: one
could model an absolutely secure CVS-Server that never
changes the repository. Such a model trivially fulﬁlls
RBAC_write but is ruled out by RBAC_do_write.
So far, RBAC_write is formalized for a single-user
client/server setting. Extending the analysis to a mul-
tiuser client/server model requires only simple modiﬁca-
tions in the deﬁnition of the step-relation; via renaming
of the working copies and the invents and knows-sets, in-
stances of abs_ci, abs_up, and modify for each client with
individual working copy can be generated. Adding suit-
able restrictions (e.g., invents- and knows-sets must be
pairwise disjoint), RBAC_write and similar properties
remain valid.
It is well known that security properties are usually
not preserved under reﬁnement (see discussion later).
The reason is that implementing one security architecture
by another opens the door to new types of attacks on the
implementation architecture that can be completely over-
looked on the abstract level. For example, on the imple-
mentation architecture it is possible to realize an attack
on the repository by combinations of POSIX commands
such as rm and setumask, etc. (Sect. 3.3.2). In principle,
our method can be applied for this type of analysis of the
implementation architecture as well. In this setting, the
step-relation and the init-relation are deﬁned as:
stepimpl ≡rm∨setumask∨· · ·∨ chmod
∨ cvs_login∨· · ·∨ cvs_update
initimpl ≡ConcState
∧ [wcs_attributes :CV S_ATTR_TAB|
wcs_attributes=∅]
Although the proofs on the implementation architecture
have the same structure as on the system architecture,
they are far more complex since concepts such as paths,
the distinction between ﬁles and directories, and their
permissions are involved. Moreover, they require new side
conditions (for example, the reﬁnement can only be es-
tablished for the case where the user is not root) that were
systematically introduced by the abstraction predicateR.
On the other hand, the higher degree of detail on
the implementation architecture makes a formalization of
new types of security properties possible. For example,
since the crucial concept directory is present on the im-
plementation level and since the existence of ﬁles can only
be established by having access to all parent directories
of a ﬁle, one can express conﬁdentiality properties such as
“the user cannot ﬁnd out that a ﬁle with name x exists in
some directory of the repository” on this level.
5 Conclusion
5.1 Discussion
We demonstrate a method for analyzing the security in
oﬀ-the-shelf system components made amenable to for-
mal, machine-based analysis. The method proceeds as
follows. First, specify the system architecture (as a frame-
work for formal security properties); second, specify the
implementation architecture (validated by inspecting in-
formal speciﬁcations or testing code); third, set up the
security technology mapping as a reﬁnement; and fourth,
prove reﬁnements and security properties by mecha-
nized proofs. The demonstration of the method follows
a case study of a security problem for a real system,
the CVS client/server architecture. We believe that the
method is applicable for a wider range of problems such as
mission-critical e-commerce applications or e-government
applications.
The core of our approach is based on the presentation
of the security technology mapping as data reﬁnement
problem. In general, it has been widely recognized that se-
curity properties cannot be easily reﬁned – actually, ﬁnd-
ing reﬁnement notions that preserve security properties is
a hot research topic [8, 14]. However, standard reﬁnement
proof technology still has its value here since it checks
that abstract security requirements are indeed achieved
by a mapping to concrete security technology and that
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implicit assumptions on this implementation have been
made explicit. Against implementation-speciﬁc attacks,
we believe that specialized security-property-reﬁnement
techniques will be limited to restricted aspects. For this
problem, in most cases the answer will be an analysis on
the implementation level, possibly by reusing results from
the abstract level.
In our approach, the analysis is based on interactive
theorem proving while security analysis is often based
on model-checking techniques for logics like LTL, the
µ-calculus, or process algebras like CSP. While these
techniques oﬀer a high degree of automation, they possess
well-known and obvious limitations: the state space must
usually be ﬁnite and in practice be very small, and the
analysis tends to be infeasible for many models, in par-
ticular those imposed by system speciﬁcations. As a con-
sequence, proof engineers tend to develop oversimpliﬁed
and unsystematically abstracted system models. In con-
trast, in our approach technical concerns like the size
of the system state space, aesthetic concerns like natu-
ralness of the modeling (in our example, we use archi-
tectural modeling), or methodological needs like realistic
treatments of system speciﬁcations do not represent fun-
damental obstacles to the analysis. We expect that the
need for realistic models may also enforce more general
and more reusable ones such that the investment can be
shared by diﬀerent research groups, and such models may
ﬁnally make their way into standardization processes.
Moreover, we have the full ﬂexibility of Z and HOL to ex-
press security properties at need.
Our case study shows that the presented technology
and method makes the treatment of complex security
problems possible. Naturally, the question arises as to
how long the formalization and the proof work took. This
question is hard to answer, partly because the method
and technical components had been developed during
the project, partly because library theorems had to be
proven, and partly because some contributors needed
time to learn Isabelle. The overall case study took about
18 man months, including the development of tool sup-
port. A considerable amount of time (about six man
months) was spent on the formalization and testing (i.e.,
reverse engineering) of the system, which was done by
Achim Brucker and Burkhart Wolﬀ. The proof work was
done by Frank Rittinger, Harald Hiss, and BurhartWolﬀ.
Using our tool support, we estimate that someone with
experience in theorem proving would be able to solve
a similar task (specifying a similarly complex system
and proving the core security properties) in less than
10 months. By improving the general technology (e.g.,
better frontends and tatic support) a further speedup by
a factor of two seems feasible.
5.2 Related work
Sandhu and Ahn described in [12] a method for em-
bedding role-based access control with the discretionary
access control provided by standard Unix systems. Our
model used this construction for providing the static roles
but extended it to a dynamic model.
Wenzel developed a speciﬁcation of the basic Unix
functionality, which was done in Isabelle/HOL and is part
of the actual Isabelle [9] distribution. On the ﬁle system
part, only a simple access model, not supporting groups
and the concepts of set-id bits, is formalized.
Our behavioral analysis is based on the same founda-
tions as Paulson’s inductive method for protocol veriﬁ-
cation [10]. Beyond the obvious diﬀerence that Paulson’s
research focus is on analysis (the language of protocols is
deliberately small and restrictive) and not on modeling,
technical diﬀerences consist merely in some details: Paul-
son uses specialized induction schemes that are automati-
cally derived from the protocol rules; these are considered
as inductive rules deﬁning the set of system traces. In con-
trast, we use standard induction over transitive relations,
which leads to a diﬀerent organization of the speciﬁcation
and the security properties and leads to diﬀerent tactic
support.
5.3 Future work
In our opinion, amazingly little work has been devoted to
the speciﬁcation of the POSIX interface; due to its often
not intuitive features, its importance for security imple-
mentations, and its high degree of reuse, this is a particu-
larly rewarding area of research. We believe that our for-
malization is a starting point for a comprehensive, more
complete model of the ﬁlesystem-related commands.
Clearly, the formal proofs established so far do not
represent a complete analysis of the (real) CVS-Server.
Many more security properties remain to be formulated,
and, by setting up diﬀerent operation restrictions Ri,
“best-practice” security policies can be formally investi-
gated. Moreover, in order to make implementation-level
security analysis more feasible, it could be highly reward-
ing to develop techniques andmethods to reuse (abstract)
system-level proofs on the more concrete levels.
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